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Abstract. Power grids vulnerability is a key issue in society. A compo-
nent failure may trigger cascades of failures across the grid and lead to a
large blackout. Complex network approaches have shown a direction to
study some of the problems faced by power grids. Within Complex Net-
work Analysis structural vulnerabilities of power grids have been studied
mostly using purely topological approaches, which assumes that flow of
power is dictated by shortest paths. However, this fails to capture the
real flow characteristics of power grids. We have proposed a flow redis-
tribution mechanism that closely mimics the flow in power grids using
the Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF). With this mechanism
we enhance existing cascading failure models to study the vulnerability
of power grids.
We apply the model to the European high-voltage grid to carry out a
comparative study for a number of centrality measures. ‘Centrality’ gives
an indication of the criticality of network components. Our model offers
a way to find those centrality measures that give the best indication of
node vulnerability in the context of power grids, by considering not only
the network topology but also the power flowing through the network.
In addition, we use the model to determine the spare capacity that is
needed to make the grid robust to targeted attacks. We also show a brief
comparison of the end results with other power grid systems to generalise
the result.
Keywords: power grids, complex networks, cascading failures, flow re-
distribution, centrality, tolerance parameter, vulnerability
1 Introduction
Power grids are the backbone of modern society. A power grid is a network
of generation, transmission and distribution sub-stations that transmit power
to households and local businesses. Energy is transferred through high-voltage
transmission lines in order to reduce losses over large distances. The evolution
of high-voltage grids has been influenced by social, technical, economic, political
and environmental decisions that favour economic prosperity, security and qual-
ity of life. A disruption in the functioning of power grids can have severe impact
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on the social welfare of society (Bompard et al. 2007). The reliability of power
grids is thus very critical for optimal functioning of society.
In recent decades a lot of blackouts have been experienced by power grids
across the world (McLinn 2009). Power outages are consequences of perturba-
tions that overload the entire system by spreading flows across the network.
These perturbations range from severe weather conditions to several human er-
rors. Failure of a component in the power grid may cause some power to be redi-
rected to its neighbours, which in turn may get overloaded and redirect power to
their neighbours causing them to fail. These failures may initially start with any
component of the power grid (faults at power station, transmission lines, defects
in the distribution network or even a small short-circuit) that propagates its
effects to its direct neighbours and so on. This effect is called a cascading failure.
Like most complex networks, power grids are also made up of small compo-
nents that act in a simple manner and together give rise to a behaviour that
emerges complex in nature (Mitchell 2009). As the size of power grids is in-
creasing over the years, it is becoming very important to understand the emer-
gent behaviour of such systems. The question still remains how complex and
vulnerable these systems are and how the small simple components give rise
to a larger complex mesh of power. Analysing vulnerability of power grids is
a significant issue in society and much has been contributed towards such ef-
forts (Albert et al. 2004, Bompard, Napoli & Xue 2009, Bompard, Napoli &
Xue 2010, Bompard, Wu & Xue 2010, Bompard et al. 2007, Bompard, Masera,
Napoli & Xue 2009, Crucitti et al. 2004, Kinney et al. 2005, Koc¸ et al. 2013, Si-
monsen et al. 2008). These discussions give rise to an interesting direction of
research that not only deals with topological (purely relating to the structure
and interconnection pattern of the grid) vulnerability but also looks into the
load flows of power grids (Arianos et al. 2009, Crucitti et al. 2004, Kinney
et al. 2005, Nasiruzzaman & Pota 2011, Youssef et al. 2011).
Disruptions (accidents, human errors, component failures, etc.) in a power
grid may lead to a failure that propagates through the grid and results in a
large-scale power outage. This cascading failure phenomenon has been researched
extensively (Bompard, Napoli & Xue 2009, Crucitti et al. 2004, Kinney et al.
2005, Pahwa et al. 2010, Simonsen et al. 2008, Van Eeten et al. 2011, Youssef
et al. 2011) but many properties of power grids are still missing from the analyses
and need to be included for a more accurate study. This leads us to study
cascading failures by incorporating properties of flows in power grids in order to
deal with the problem of power outages in high-voltage power grids. Through this
study we want to identify the most vulnerable nodes in high-voltage power grids
(whose removal causes most damage to the grid) and find out how much capacity
is required at each node so that the power grid sustains attacks and failures. More
concretely we want to answer two questions: 1) which measure of centrality in
complex networks gives the best indication of node vulnerability in power grids
and 2) what should be the minimal node tolerance level (node capacity relative
to the typical loading level) in order to prevent cascading failures that have
impact on more than ten percent of the energy delivery.
To answer these questions, we need to predict the evolution of cascading
failures in a high-voltage power grid with more accuracy than existing theoretical
Complex Network Analysis (CNA) models. The existing cascading failure models
(Crucitti et al. 2004, Kinney et al. 2005) assume that power flows between two
nodes via the shortest path that exists between them and a few others deal with
Direct Current (DC) flow analysis incorporating a dynamic behaviour in the
model (Koc¸ et al. 2013, Youssef et al. 2011). It is of little significance whether
the length of the shortest path is based on distance or impedance of each link
in a path. Power, in reality, flows through multiple paths that exist between
two nodes and is divided between these paths based on electrical properties
(impedance, conductance, capacitance) of the transmission links as depicted in
Fig. 1. Hence, we propose a model with a more realistic flow redistribution
mechanism and use it to simulate cascading failures. We trigger a cascading
failure by removing a node with the highest centrality (Boccaletti et al. 2006)
according to four different centrality measures to find out which removal is the
most disruptive and to know which measure best captures the vulnerability of
nodes to cascading failures. Thereafter, in the second phase, we perform a new
set of cascading failure simulations for different values of the tolerance level by
deleting the most vulnerable node according to the centrality in the first phase.
This second set of simulations is aimed at finding the minimal tolerance level
needed to prevent high-impact cascading failures.
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Fig. 1. A network diagram showing the distribution of power across multiple paths
between a pair of generation and distribution nodes of a power grid.
The next section, Sect. 2, talks about the context in which this work is carried
out. In Subsect. 2.1 we describe literature in which power grids are studied from
a complex networks point of view, while Subsect. 2.2 explains the basis for our
proposed flow redistribution mechanism. In Sect. 3, we describe our cascading
failure model and its constituent parts in detail. Section 4 is about the simula-
tions. We start by defining the settings for our simulations. Next, we talk about
the performance measures that are used to quantify the vulnerability of power
grids in case of cascading failures. The section continues with a description of
the simulation approach and finishes with a discussion of the simulation results.
Section 5 marks the end of this article with a short summary and focal points
of this research. It also explains future potential that emerges from this work.
2 Related Work
2.1 Complex Network Analysis
This section is dedicated to the relevant work carried out in the field of power
grids and cascading failures. We describe summaries of some relevant papers
in detail and focal points of each work that might be useful for expanding our
model.
Researchers initially focussed on static failures in complex networks (Albert
et al. 2004, Albert et al. 2000, Callaway et al. 2000, Cohen et al. 2000). These in-
clude the removal of certain components of a network and thereby evaluating the
drop in performance of such a network. However, many infrastructure networks
like the transport grid/gas pipelines may lose a sizeable part of their performance
after a static failure and cause an overload in other parts of the network leading
to a partial or complete disruption of facilities. This redistribution of flows led to
development of dynamical approaches (Crucitti et al. 2004, Motter & Lai 2002)
and their application to more real-world networks.
Next we talk about a dynamic model of cascading failures for complex net-
works: Crucitti-Latora-Marchiori (CLM) model, by Crucitti et al. (2004). They
build a simple model to show how small triggers could lead to catastrophic events
in infrastructure networks. The model explains redistribution of flows within the
network upon break down of a single node. They show that the collapse of a
single node with the highest load is sufficient to considerably lower the efficiency
of the entire network.
The CLM model has been adapted to the North American high-voltage power
grid by Kinney et al. (2005). The north American power grid is one of the most
complex technological networks and transmits electricity but also failures to
many parts of the grid. They modelled the grid with certain assumptions about
how the load is transferred from one transmission substation to another. Their
results suggest that a breakdown of transmission sub-stations could lead up to
a loss of 25% of efficiency by spreading flows across the network. Furthermore,
they found out that disruption of 40% of the transmission sub-stations lead to
cascading failures.
Considerable work has been carried out by researchers in the field of cascading
failures in the direction of stationary network load models. The above mentioned
studies have that feature in common. Simonsen et al. (2008) have taken a step
further and studied the transient dynamics of power systems caused by an initial
shock in the network. They have justified their work by the fact that loads have
oscillations while adjusting to the new structure of the network and some parts
may breakdown before the network stabilises again. The lack of a dynamic load
model greatly overestimates the robustness of the network. Furthermore, they
conclude that using stationary network load models might predict a different
failure sequence for the network far from reality.
Until now we have discussed literature that marks direct application of
context-independent concepts and measures from CNA to power grids. Power
grids cannot be encapsulated by generic properties of a complex network. Bom-
pard, Masera, Napoli & Xue (2009) have done major work in exploring the
shortcomings of generic application and designing new methodologies to study
power grids more efficiently.
In (Bompard, Napoli & Xue 2009) they analyse the structural vulnerabilities
of power grids by extending the topological approach to include the physical
operative state of the grid in terms of the flows distributing in the links. The
authors designed new metrics such as entropic degree and net-ability and com-
pared them with the traditional purely topological metrics. Entropic degree takes
into account not only the number of connections a node has but also the dis-
tribution of weights around these connections. It provides a fairly quantitative
measurement of the importance of sub-stations in a power grid. Net-ability de-
scribes how efficiently power flows over the lines of a transmission grid from
supply to demand side. They further extended the topological approach to in-
corporate several other features of a power grid such as line flow limits, flow
paths and demand/supply distribution (Bompard, Napoli & Xue 2010). Path
redundancy quantifies the available redundancy of paths in transmitting power
from generation to distribution sub-stations using the concept of entropy. In case
of a cascading failure, Survivability, based on path redundancy and net-ability,
measures the effectiveness of a grid to match demand with the generation.
On the lines of extending topological approach to analyse power grids, Bom-
pard, Wu & Xue (2010) formulated an electrical betweenness based approach
that captures the specific properties of power grids in more detail. This metric
focusses on the impedances of the transmission lines. They compared this with
the traditional betweenness metric for IEEE bus networks and found that this
traditional centrality measure underestimates the vulnerability of power grids.
Centrality is the backbone for identifying critical components in a complex
network. Tutzauer (2007) proposed a centrality measure based on entropy that
characterises networks with flow along multiple paths. His motivation lies in
the idea that centrality measures must be related to the underlying network
properties. Very often, researchers use centrality measures to validate models
for a particular type of network that may have flow characteristics different
from the ones assumed by the measure. Borgatti (2005) points out that this
implicit assumption about the flow characteristics of network may give rise to
misleading results.
Koc¸ et al. (2013) have designed a context-dependent centrality measure to
assess the importance of nodes in a power grid. The measure describes the sig-
nificance of a node based on the amount of power flowing through that node to
its neighbours. Node Significance is a directed and weighted measure and a good
estimate of the robustness of a node in a power grid.
Bompard’s seminal work may have inspired optimisation of distributed flows
in power grids from a design perspective. Asztalos et al. (2012) used an edge
weighting scheme to optimise the flow efficiency and robustness of scale-free
networks to cascading failures. They studied models where flow is distributed
and initiates from all paths between a pair of source and sink nodes.
Van Eeten et al. (2011) illustrate the importance of energy networks. They
carry out empirical investigations in the interdependencies of critical infrastruc-
tures. Their work involves analysing data from news reports and correlations
between cascading failures across different infrastructures. Their findings were
rather focused on two domains: telecommunications and energy. Most cascades
have propagated from energy networks to telecommunications and there is no
sign of a bidirectional relationship.
Power grids have been around for almost two centuries and the continuing
complex interconnection patterns have made them more liable to disruptions.
Pahwa et al. (2010) have explored mitigation strategies against cascading effects
and agreed upon the use of distributed renewable energy sources for decreasing
the load on power grids. Subsequently, Youssef et al. (2011) have also explored
robustness measures of power grids with respect to cascading failures using a
DC power flow model.
2.2 Power Flows
In a power grid, flow between a pair of source and sink nodes does not follow the
shortest path between them. Power follows a distributed path based on many
system properties (impedance, conductance, capacitance) that impose certain
limits on the capacity of these paths (Bompard, Napoli & Xue 2009). Every
path that constitutes the flow from source A to sink B is made of several links
each. These links have different parameters and each path may contribute a
different proportion of power to the flow from source A to sink B.
The amount of information flowing between a pair of nodes is reflected by the
shortest path between the nodes (Albert et al. 2004, Crucitti et al. 2004, Rosas-
Casals et al. 2007). Contrary to this assumption, in power engineering, electric
current (the information flowing in power grids) follows multiple paths between
a pair of nodes. Merely using simplified measures from the theory of CNA for
defining flow redistribution in a power grid is not enough. The flow in a power
grid can be represented in essence by the PTDF.
The Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF) (Dobson et al. 2001) de-
scribes the sensitivity of each transmission link to power injection at a particular
node and withdrawal at a reference node. This reference node is also known as
Slack. If the slack node is missing, then a generator node with the highest real
power is chosen as slack for the system.
PTDF of a component T for a flow between source A and sink B reflects the
percentage of power that flows through that component T. For instance, when
component Z (part of a path between A and B) has a PTDF of 0.2 for a transfer
from A to B, then a transfer of 100 MW from A to B would result in an increase
of 20 MW at component Z. On the other hand, if the same factor is −0.2, then
this transfer would result in a decrease of 20 MW at component Z. This implies
that for calculating the PTDF of a transmission link, the source and sink nodes
must be specified. In the absence of a sink, the reference node acts as the sink
that demands the injection at source in the first place. PTDFs are very useful
for analysing the change in load at a particular transmission link and identifying
the links that might overshoot their capacity.
For a network with N nodes and K transmission links, the PTDF matrix is
given by,
A =
 a11 a12 . . . a1N...
aK1 aK2 . . . aKN
 , (1)
where A is a K ×N matrix and aij is the change in power of link i when 1 unit
of power is injected at node j and withdrawn at the slack node.
The PTDF of a transmission link i for a flow between a pair of nodes g and
d can be defined using (1) and the slack node as follows,
ρgd = aig − aid , (2)
where ρgdi is the change in power of link i when 1 unit of power is injected at
node g and withdrawn at node d.
Computation of the PTDF matrix requires a model to calculate load flows
and in most cases a DC model of power flow (Dobson et al. 2001) is used. DC
power flow models are widely used by the power engineering sector to compute
load flows for high-voltage transmission grids. Their reliability has been long
questioned and not completely accepted for all application purposes but it is
nonetheless a good approximation of active power flows and usually gives values
close to ±5% (Purchala et al. 2005) as long as the conditions forming the basis
of the method are met with. For a high voltage transmission grid, the conditions
for a DC model are satisfied (Purchala et al. 2005).
3 Model
The cascading failure model that we have designed for simulating a high-voltage
power grid has three distinct parts, namely input, redistribution and output
illustrated in Fig. 2. We explain these parts in the following three subsections.
Network (Topology + Line Loads)
Tolerance Parameter
Removal Strategy
Ci = α · Li(0) ∀ i = 1, 2, . . . N
Li(t) - Load at time t
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Fig. 2. Scheme showing the constituent parts of the cascading failure model. Left is
the input, in the middle is the flow redistribution and to the right is the output. The
process is iterated until no more changes, i.e. there is no more flow redistribution and
no more nodes are removed because of overloading.
3.1 Input
The input settings for our model consists of the tolerance parameter, the net-
work model and the removal strategy.
Tolerance parameter α
Capacity is a characteristic property of each node/link in any network and it
dictates the maximum load a node/link can withstand. Naturally, we will assume
that capacity Ci of a node i is directly proportional to its initial stable load Li(0)
(Motter & Lai 2002) at the start of the simulation (time t = 0). It is defined as
follows,
Ci = α · Li(0) ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , N , (3)
where Li(0) is the current power flowing through each node at the moment when
a DC power flow solution was calculated. This proportionality coefficient α ≥ 1
is the tolerance parameter that marks an upper bound on the load that can flow
through each node at any time during the simulation. α is technology dependent,
i.e. it cannot be an unreasonably high value.
From (3), it is evident to state the following relation between the tolerance
parameter and loading level which is a more inherently natural concept to grasp,
α =
100
ll
, (4)
where,
α is the tolerance parameter and ll is the loading level expressed as a percentage.
The relation in (4) implies that when the loading level is say 50%, the toler-
ance parameter will be α = 2, i.e. the network can handle twice its initial load
at each node.
Network Model
High-voltage transmission grid data is used (UCTE n.d.). It has 1254 nodes and
1944 directed links. The network has the following characteristics,
average clustering coefficient < C >= 0.0126
diameter d = 48
average path length < l >= 17.28
The degree and betweenness distributions of this network are plotted in Fig.
3.
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Fig. 3. Degree and Betweenness distributions of EU power grid. The topology of this
network is considered undirected and unweighted for these distributions.
This network data consists of the topology of the network, the demand and
supply parameters at each generation and load station, and node voltages. A DC
power flow solution with all these parameters gives an approximate amount of
power flowing through all the high-voltage transmission links of the grid. These
load values act as weights in our analysis. This is a stable snapshot of the system
that we use for future modelling and simulation purposes.
The DC power flow solution comes from a MATLAB package called MAT-
POWER (Zimmerman n.d.). The calculation of PTDF matrices is also a part of
this package. It is used for modelling the power grid as a network to solve power
flow equations and carry out other power flow computation problems.
Removal Strategy
The cause for redistribution of flows in a power grid is due to a component failure
or shut-down. In order to simulate the network for cascading failures we have
to remove a node from the network to trigger the redistribution of flows. This
removal can either be Random or Targeted. By removing the most important
(centrality (Boccaletti et al. 2006)) node from the network we can estimate the
worst case damage caused to a power grid due to cascading failures. Nodes of
the power network are considered to shut down irreversibly, i.e. once they are
switched off during the simulation of a cascading failure (whether due to a failure
being propagated or a safeguarding strategy to cut-off a part of the network)
they are assumed to be dead for the remaining period of the simulation. We
made this choice because of the fact that this work aims at a short interval of
time which is conceived from a fault in the network, resulting in a power outage
in a matter of seconds.
We included three measures from the theory of CNA that are applicable to
all generic network topologies. These are as follows,
– Betweenness Centrality (undirected, unweighted)
– Degree Centrality (undirected, unweighted)
– Closeness Centrality (undirected, unweighted)
And one measure specifically designed for power grids called Node Significance
(directed, weighted) explained previously in Sect. 2.1.
These measures provide us with information about the importance of a node
in a network with respect to the network itself. We take only undirected and
unweighted traditional measures to emphasize on the context-independent part
of our study.
On the basis of the above discussion we form the following five strategies for
node removal which trigger a cascading failure,
1. Betweenness based removal
2. Degree based removal
3. Closeness based removal
4. Node Significance based removal
5. Random removal
1-4 belong to the targeted removals and are based on the importance of a node
within a network. A random removal signifies failure or shut-down of a random
component.
3.2 Flow Redistribution
Once a node has been removed, flows start to redistribute in the network. When a
node is removed from the network, the incoming and outgoing links have certain
loads that redistribute to the neighbours of the removed node.
Figure 4 illustrates the flow redistribution mechanism that we designed for
re-routing power in case of a failure or an attack on a power grid. When node
x is removed, all the incoming loads at node x are injected to its neighbouring
nodes at the other end of the transmission links. Similarly, all the outgoing loads
from node x are rejected from its neighbouring nodes at the other end of the
x i j 
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Fig. 4. Node N is removed from the network and flows redistribute to its neighbours
transmission links. It can be seen from Fig. 4 that the link carrying load lix will
be removed from the network after node x has been removed and the load lix will
be injected into node i. This procedure is applied to all the incoming neighbours
i of node x. Similarly, for all the outgoing neighbours j of node x, a rejection of
load lxj occurs at each node j.
An injection makes sure that the load that was going into node x will now be
redistributed to other parts of the network and a rejection allows for removing
the excessive load from a part of the network that does not actually receive it
any more.
A cumulative shift in load at each node is graphically shown in the flow
redistribution part of the model in Fig. 2. Due to the numerous injections and
rejections, loads at each node either increase or decrease and some might even
change the direction of flow of power.
Using (1) we can deduce equations formulating injections and rejections for
removal of node x as follows,
I =
∑
i∈IN
lix · ui , (5)
R =
∑
j∈ON
lxj · uj , (6)
where IN and ON are sets of incoming and outgoing neighbours of x and ui
and uj are K × 1 column vectors specifying all row elements of the ith and jth
column of the PTDF matrix, respectively. I and R are K × 1 column vectors of
cumulative injections and rejections at every transmission link of the power grid
due to removal of node x.
Using (5) and (6), we can state the following,
LNEW = LOLD + I −R , (7)
where LNEW and LOLD are K × 1 column vectors specifying the loads at each
transmission link.
After the initial trigger for simulating cascading failures, wherein we remove
a node and all the incoming and outgoing links of this node from the network,
the flow dynamics of the power grid change. We mark these nodes and links as
out-of-service. As the next step, the model calculates the new loads for all the
in-service transmission links. The loads flowing through each of the remaining
nodes of the network are calculated by simply summing up all the incoming or
outgoing loads of each node.
Each node may or may not have exceeded its capacity due to the possibility
of extra incoming load. In (8) if the boolean statement S is true then at time t
node i has exceeded its capacity and will be made out-of-service together with
all its incoming and outgoing links.
S =
{
1 if Li(t) > Ci
0 otherwise
, (8)
As a result of rendering some nodes and their links out-of-service, some parts
of the network may get disconnected and disintegrate into separate islands. Each
island of the disintegrated network may or may not have generation substations.
If an island is free of any generating source then it is dead, marked red in Fig.
5. However, if an island has a generating source, then we iterate the model on
all such islands by removing all the nodes (together with their connected links)
with the value of S as 1 or true, ie. overloaded nodes. Each island may result
in an additional group of islands and the model is iterated on each group of
islands belonging to the same time step simultaneously. This procedure can be
encapsulated by a tree structure illustrated in Fig. 5.
Some islands may not be affected completely by flow redistribution, i.e. they
still have a power generating source. In this case they are still functioning and
are marked green in Fig. 5. Cascading effects have subsided in such islands and
they are still providing energy for a part of their consumers. All the interme-
diate islands that could break down completely due to cascading failure are
marked blue. The tree structure shows how an island (original power grid under
consideration) can undergo changes in the flow of power and disintegrate into
several islands some of which are functioning and some are deeply affected by
the cascade.
At each time step of the simulation, a few nodes may get overloaded. The
transition between simulation steps is assumed to be static as compared to a
dynamic transient analysis where power flows mimic the real time taken for
power to flow through a line with certain physical properties. Overloaded nodes
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Fig. 5. A tree structure depicting the logical depth of the model and iterating procedure
are kicked out of the simulation all at once for any intermediate state of the
simulation.
3.3 Output
We carry out simulations to observe the evolution of a cascade. The output of our
model consists of several islands that may or may not be able to deliver power
to their customers. At each time step a network is produced consisting of one
or more disconnected components (islands). Every island contains information
about the increase or decrease in load of each node belonging to that island. This
group of disconnected islands is fed back as input to the model for the next time
step after removing the overloaded nodes and connected links from the network.
The flow redistribution model is iterated again on these group of islands. After
processing this information from each time step we are able to assess the damage
caused to the power grid.
4 Results
We followed a simulation based approach to solve our research problem. Simula-
tions require an environment and the settings for that environment are defined
in the next section followed by the approach used in the simulations and the
discussion that stimulated from the results of our simulations.
4.1 Scenario
The scenario for carrying out our simulations is composed of three parts,
– Network Model
The main focus is on the high-voltage European power grid. This data con-
sists of the topology and load settings of the grid and is available on-line
from the database of Union for the Coordination of Transport of Electric-
ity (UCTE) (UCTE n.d.). Apart from this we have also considered IEEE
power system models (N = 30, 39, and 118)for comparison of a real power
grid to synthetic network topologies.
– Node Removal Strategies
These strategies are based on centrality measures for nodes in a network.
We focus on betweenness centrality, closeness centrality and degree central-
ity (Newman 2010) as theoretical measures from CNA to compare with node
significance (Koc¸ et al. 2013). We also analyse the network using an aver-
age of a hundred random removals. The distinction will be made wherever
necessary.
– Tolerance Parameter
We have taken a realistic range of the tolerance parameter, α ∈ [1.01, 2.8] (3),
in various settings. In reality this is different for each link/node of a network
model that represents a power grid but for simplicity we have assumed a
homogeneous loading level of the network, i.e. each node is loaded to the
same percentage of its capacity.
4.2 Performance Measures
The following performance measures are used to assess the vulnerability of power
grids,
– Damage 1 (D1)
The fraction of nodes being overloaded at any time during a cascading failure
represents the cumulative damage caused to a power grid at that point in
time. This metric as a performance measure is very relevant to our work
because a cascading failure propagates as a result of overloading.
– Damage 2 (D2)
The fraction of energy demand that cannot be matched at any time during
a cascading failure represents the cumulative damage caused to power grid
users (consumers) at that point in time. This metric is relevant to our work
because cascading failures directly affect the consumers of a power grid.
4.3 Simulations
We simulated our cascading failure model defined in Sect. 3 using proposed
flow redistribution mechanism on the UCTE network model and other IEEE
synthetic topologies. Cascading effects were observed for several removal strate-
gies under different input parameter settings. To encapsulate a wide domain of
removal strategies we removed nodes with the highest betweenness centrality,
degree centrality, closeness centrality and node significance separately and let
the network mimic redistribution of flows that lead to a power outage if at all.
For random failures and faults in the network, we removed a random node and
averaged the damage caused by a hundred such removals. We used previously
defined measures of damage to quantify the vulnerability of a power grid to cas-
cading failures. We varied the tolerance parameter α and observed the evolution
of D1 and D2 caused to the network. Note that each iteration of the simulation
is counted as 1 time step.
4.4 Discussion
Figure 6 shows a comparison of the damage caused by the five different removal
strategies (of Subsect. 4.1), using the two ways to define damage (Subsect. 4.2)
for a realistic loading level (α = 1.5). We observe that the damage increased
with time and after a certain point in time the effects stabilised. The two per-
formance measures quantifying the damage (one in Fig. 6a and the other in
Fig. 6b), show a similar trend. Therefore our conclusions do not depend on the
chosen performance measure. As illustrated in Fig. 6, the damage caused by a
removal strategy based on node significance results in approximately 20 times
more damage compared to removal strategies based on the theory of CNA (Sect.
3.1). The attack strategies based on the traditional centrality measures even
show less damage than random node removal does.
This shows that measures from CNA underestimate the vulnerability of a
power grid to targeted attacks. Apparently, the removal strategies based on
these measures do not attack the most important nodes in the grid. Therefore,
these measures are not the best way to comment on the centrality of nodes in
a power grid. Heuristically speaking, node significance may be an upper bound
for the worst case damage caused to a power grid due to cascading failures. In
order to focus on this worst case, i.e. the most disruptive removal strategy, we
further concentrate on node significance.
Since both D1 and D2 plotted over time for a particular value of α are
comparable to each other, we use only D2 for expressing further results, i.e.
fraction of unavailable energy. As expected, in Fig. 7, we see that the final damage
after a cascading failure has subsided decreases with an increase in the tolerance
parameter. The question now comes up how large the tolerance parameter should
be in order to limit the damage to a given value. We address this question in Fig.
8 by plotting the total damage after cascading failure has subsided as a function
of the tolerance parameter. It can be seen that the damage caused by cascading
failures decreases by increasing the tolerance parameter, however, it is not a
monotonically decreasing function. It behaves erratically for a small change in
the tolerance parameter.
The reason for this erratic behaviour lies in the origin of flow redistribution.
Each sub-station of the power grid is assumed to be homogeneously loaded at the
beginning. Loads at each substation change after a failure or shut-down causes
flows to redistribute. As a result each sub-station has a different threshold for
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Fig. 6. Comparison of damage caused over time for different removal strategies due to
a cascading failure for α = 1.50
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Fig. 7. Effect of load tolerance α on the damage caused to the system under a targeted
attack based on node significance
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Fig. 8. Final D2 caused by removing the most significant node in the network for
different values of tolerance parameter. The dotted lines in (a) represent reliability
level of the system after a cascading failure has subsided, i.e. 90% reliability (10%
damage) 95% Reliability (5% Damage).
breaking down. To illustrate this we take α = 1.56 and remove a node with the
highest node significance from the network. There are 21 nodes that get over-
loaded in the first time step. At α = 1.57 there are 20 nodes that get overloaded
in the first time step. Since the flows start redistributing after the first time step,
this change in the number of overloaded nodes restructures the generation of is-
lands and the redistribution takes different paths in different islands for these
two values of α. Since we do not have reversible nodes, islands are generated
because connectedness of the network cannot be kept intact after overloaded
nodes go out-of-service. Therefore, the dynamics of flows change considerably
for a very small change in the value of α (step increments of .01) as shown in
Fig. 8a. We change the step increments to .001 and the inset of Fig. 8a shows
that the damage curve becomes more erratic. To compare our results for a more
generic overview, we plotted the final damage as a function of the tolerance pa-
rameter also for IEEE synthetic topologies. Figure 8b confirms our approach as
in showing similar patterns of degradation in damage when capacity increases
(α increases) for different topologies of synthetic IEEE networks.
To show the long-term trend we plotted a simple moving average of the dam-
age caused at each step of the tolerance parameter. Simple moving average is
the mean of previous z discrete data points. The curve represents the general
long-term trend of reducing damage to a power grid by increasing the toler-
ance parameter. In Fig. 8a we have taken z = 10 data points and z = 20 data
points. If we have more data points in the window of moving averages, we get a
smoother relation between D2 and α owing to the definition of moving averages
itself. Hence, moving average is a good numerical approximation to show the in-
tuitive relation between the destruction caused by a power outage and maximum
capacity of power system components.
As can be seen in Fig. 8a, if we want to limit the damage to the European
high-voltage power grid to 5−10% (90−95% reliability), a value of α = 1.79−1.89
for the tolerance parameter would suffice. This implies that if each sub-station
of the UCTE power grid is loaded to at most 55.8% (4) of its total capacity,
the power grid will provide energy for at least 90% of its consumers, even if an
attack targeted to the most vulnerable node is carried out.
5 Conclusions
5.1 Summary
We used a simulation based approach to implement a flow redistribution mech-
anism that takes into account the underlying flow characteristics of power grids.
We continued the research by analysing the vulnerability of the European high-
voltage power grid using our enhanced model. This analysis involved a study of
the damage to the grid caused by a node removal based on the highest central-
ity for four centrality measures: betweenness, closeness, node degree and node
significance. We carried out a comparison based on these four removal strate-
gies and an average of a hundred random removals. In the analysis ‘damage’ is
measured in terms of number of overloaded nodes and the percentage of energy
demand that could not be satisfied.
As expected, the removal of a random node caused less damage than a tar-
geted attack for node significance. Surprisingly, this was not the case for the
other centrality measures. Our studies show that the theoretical centrality mea-
sures (betweenness, closeness and node degree) underestimate the vulnerability
of power grids to cascading failures in comparison with node significance, which
is a context based measure. Removing a node with the highest node significance
causes remarkably more damage than removing a node with the highest central-
ity (betweenness/closeness/degree). This shows that node significance is more
suitable than the traditional centrality measures for finding the most vulnerable
nodes in a power grid.
A second result that we obtained by using our model for flow redistribution
is the quantification of the needed tolerance level in the European high-voltage
power grid in order to limit the damage caused by targeted attacks. If approxi-
mately eighty percent of spare capacity is available for each node (with respect
to the typical node loading level), then a removal of the most vulnerable node
(that is the node with highest node significance) causes at most ten percent of
damage (measured in amount of dissatisfied energy demand).
By modelling flow redistribution in a realistic manner, we have developed
a way to identify the vulnerable nodes in a power grid and to determine the
node capacity that is needed to guarantee a certain level of robustness against
targeted attacks. In addition, we showed that centrality of nodes in power grids
should not be defined based on topological network properties only; the power
flowing through the grid should be considered when defining centrality in the
context of power grids.
5.2 Future Work
We examined cascading failures in power grids and wrote a detailed compari-
son between different centrality measures. A logical next step is to expand the
typography and include more centrality measures related to link capacities and
optimised flow distribution. A detailed investigation in entropy based centrality
measures will also be helpful in understanding the vulnerability of power grids.
Furthermore, transient dynamic analysis of power flow can be explored for
a more real-time behaviour. So far we have assumed that transition from one
simulation stage to the next is discrete. Using the temporal behaviour of power
flow through transmission lines will be a step closer to reality.
We also assume that the links are loaded homogeneously. An effort towards
using real capacities of power components instead of estimates with tolerance
parameter would provide for a more accurate study.
Concerning applications to the industry, with minor changes to input pa-
rameters and a suitable replacement for power distribution this model can be
applied to low voltage segments to investigate their structural vulnerabilities as
an initiative towards smart-grids.
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